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The SEC's Regulation A+: Small Business Goes
Under the Bus Again
Rutheford B Campbell,Jr.'

Title IV of theJOBS Act, which is entitled "Small Company
Capital Formation," requires the Securities and Exchange
Commission to adopt new rules regarding offerings under
Regulation A. The Commission has now adopted its final
regulations implementing Title IV and providing a new
regulatory regime for exempt offerings under Section 3(b) of the
Securities Act of 1933. The new regime is generally referred to as
RegulationA+.
Unfortunately, historyand empirical data regardingthe use of
Regulation A and Regulation D strongly suggest that the final
Regulation A+ rules are unlikely to provide any materialrelieffor
small businesses in their difficult search for efficient sources of
external capital. Instead, the exemption provided by Regulation
A+ will likely be attractive only to larger businesses that are not
currently reportingcompanies under the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934.
To a significant extent, this outcome is the result of an
effective campaign mounted by state securities regulators,
prosecuted through their trade association, the North American
SecuritiesAdministratorsAssociation (NASAA), and enabled by
the Securities and Exchange Commission (Commission). Once
again, NASAA-aided and abetted by the Commissioneffectively blocked small businesses from a fair and efficient path
to external capital, destroying an important component of the
JOBS Act that was specifically designed to facilitate small
business capital formation. In the vernacular of the day, small
businesses were-again-thrownunder the bus.
INTRODUCTION

Title IV of the JOBS Act, which is entitled "Small Company Capital
Formation," requires the Securities and Exchange Commission to adopt new rules
Spears-Gilbert Professor of Law, University of Kentucky College Law. rcampbel@uky.edu, (859)
257-4050. The author thanks Michael Hill, Rebecca McKinney, and William Middleton for their
assistance in the preparation of this article.
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regarding offerings under Regulation A.2 The Commission has now adopted its
final regulations that implement Title IW and provide a new regulatory regime for
4
exempt offerings under Section 3(b) of the Securities Act of 1933 (the 1933 Act).
The new regime is generally referred to as Regulation A+.'
While the anticipation of the Regulation A+ rules generated enthusiasm in
some quarters, 6 the new, final Regulation A+ rules seem unlikely to provide any
material relief for small businesses in their difficult search for efficient sources of
external capital. Unfortunately, history and empirical data regarding the use of
Regulation A and Regulation D strongly suggest that small businesses will not be
able to utilize Regulation A+. Instead, the exemption provided by Regulation A+
will likely be attractive only to larger businesses that are not currently reporting
companies under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the 1934 Act).7
To a significant extent, this outcome is the result of an effective campaign
mounted by state securities regulators, prosecuted through their trade association,
the North American Securities Administrators Association (NASAA), and enabled
by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC or Commission). Once again,
NASAA-aided and abetted by the Commission-effectively blocked small
businesses from a fair and efficient path to external capital. In the vernacular of the
day, small businesses were-again-thrown under the bus.
Today, only the most extreme free market economists would argue that capital
formation needs no governmental intervention-that the entirely free and
unregulated capital market will result in an efficient allocation of capital.
Governmental regulation of capital formation, however, must be logical, fair, and
directed to improving, not throttling, efficient and fair allocation of our precious
capital among the businesses in our market economy.

2
Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 401(b)(2), 126 Stat. 306,
323-24
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b)(2) (2012)).
3
Amendments for Small and Additional Issues Exemptions Under the Securities Act (Regulation
A), 80 Fed. Reg. 21,806 (April 20, 2015) (to be codified at 17 C.F.RI pts. 200, 230, 232, 239, 240, 249,
and 260) [hereinafter Adopting Release Regulation A].
4
See 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b).
s See, e.g., Michael Raneri, Raising Growth Capital via Regulation A+, CFO (May 29, 2015),
http://ww2.cfo.com/credit-capital/2015/05/raising-growth-capital-via-regulation/. On May 22, 2015,
Maura Healey, Attorney General of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, filed a Petition for Review
with the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit "relating to the
preemption of state securities law registration and qualification requirements for certain Regulation A
securities." Petition for Review at 1, Galvin v. SEC, No. 15-1150 (D.C. Cir. May 22, 2015). The
Petition asks the Court to issue a permanent injunction against the preemption rules. Id. at 2. As a basis
for that relief, the Petition states that the rules are "arbitrary, capricious, and otherwise not in
accordance with the Administrative Procedure Act, the Securities Act of 1933, and other law." Id. At the
time of this article, the case is still pending.
6 See, e.g., Raneri, supra note 5.
'Under Section 12(g) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, a company becomes subject to
periodic reporting requirements if the company has assets in excess of $10 million and either 2,000
shareholders of record or 500 unaccredited shareholders of record. 15 U.S.C. § 78 1(g) (2014).
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With regard to the rules governing capital formation by small businesses, it is
impossible to conclude that an efficient and fair allocation of capital in the case of
small businesses is facilitated by imposing fifty-plus separate and independent
securities registration regimes on small businesses when they search for external
capital. At the risk of overly simplifying one's criticism-but not at the risk of
overstatement-such a regulatory system is bizarre.
Nonetheless, NASAA for decades has fought vigorously and successfully to
preserve such a system to govern small business capital formation. Even more
disturbing, perhaps, is the fact that the Commission-for reasons that are difficult
to understand-has cooperated with NASAA, allowing state laws and regulations
to eviscerate efficient and well-conceived federal exemptions from registration,
rules that were designed for small businesses and their special needs and compelling
circumstances.' Perhaps it should be no surprise, therefore, that it has happened
again in the Commission's final Regulation A+ rules.
The purposes of this article are to explain the Regulation A+ rules and their
likely impact-if any-on small business capital formation and to offer comments
regarding who bears responsibility for the failure of these new rules to offer small
businesses an efficient access to extemal capital.
I. SMALL BUSINESSES
It is difficult, at least with precision, to define a "small business." When
considering the issue of capital formation, one can typically begin with the
categories used by the Small Business Administration (SBA) for collecting and
publishing data about small businesses.' Historically, the SBA has reported data for
firms employing less than twenty persons and firms employing less than one
hundred persons.
SBA data indicate that there are about five million firms in the United States
operating with less than twenty employees. 1" These very small firms account for
approximately eighteen percent of the employment in America. Historical data
also indicate that there are about five and one-half million firms with less than one

' See Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr., The Wreck of Regulation D: The Unintended (and Bad)
Outcomes for the SEC's Crown Jewel Exemptions, 66 BUS. LAW. 919, 937-38 (2011) [hereinafter
Campbell, The Wreck of Regulation D] ("The testimony and prepared remarks of then-Chairman
Levitt offered during the legislative hearings skillfully dodged any support for broad preemption of state
authority over securities offerings.").
' See, e.g., Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr., Regulation A: Small Businesses' Search for "a Moderate
Capital,"31 DEL.J. CORP. L. 77,84-85 (2006) [hereinafter Campbell, A ModerateCapital].
'0 SMALL Bus. ADMIN., THE SMALL BUSINESS ECONOMY: A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT
2010 at 121 (2010).
" Id.; see Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr., RegulationA and the JOBS Act: A Failureto Resuscitate, 7
OHIO ST. ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 317, 320 (2012) [hereinafter Campbell, A Failure to
Resuscitate].
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hundred employees and that such firms over the years usually account for around
thirty-five percent of employment. 2
We also know that these firms overwhelmingly need external capital and that
there are unique structural and economic impediments these small firms face when
they attempt to secure external capital. 3 Specifically, the small firms typically have
high relative transaction costs when they go after external capital. They need small
amounts of external capital, which means that their relative offering costs (offering
costs as a percentage of the total size of the offering) go up.' 4 Additionally, and
related to the matter of relative offering costs, financial intermediation is typically
not available for small offerings. Small offerings simply will not support the costs
that reputable investment bankers or brokers encounter in learning and selling
small deals.'
Title IV of the JOBS Act, by most appearances, was designed to provide
efficient access to external capital for these small businesses. The title of Title IV,
after all, is "Small Company Capital Formation. ""
It is these five million-plus businesses that this article addresses, and,
regrettably, that this article concludes will not, to any material extent, be able to use
Title IV as a means to access external capital.

II. A BRIEF LOOK BACK AT THE HISTORY
OF SECTION 3(b) AND REGULATION A 7
Regulation A was first adopted by the Commission in 19368 and was
extensively revised in 1941." It was 1953, however, before the modem structure for
Regulation A was finally enacted by the Commission.20 There were later
amendments to Regulation A by the Commission. In 1992, for example, the
Commission amended Regulation A to increase the limit of the offering to $5
12 SMALL BUS. ADMIN., THE SMALL BUSINESS ECONOMY: A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT

2004 at 179 (2004).
13
14

See Campbell, A Moderate Capital,supra note 9, at 86-88.
See Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr., The New Regulation ofSmall Business CapitalFormation:The

Impact-If Any-of the JOBS Act, 102 KY. L.J. 815, 817-18 (2014) [hereinafter Campbell, The
Impact of JOBS]. For example, if offering expenses (e.g., fees paid to lawyers, accountants,
underwriters, etc) amount to $10 and the total amount of the offering is $100, the relative offering costs
are ten percent.
s See generally id. at 818 (showing that only 5.8% of all Regulation D offerings of $1 million or
less from a sample had financial intermediation).
' 6 Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, tit. IV, 126 Stat. 306, 32325 (2012) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77c(b), 77r(b)4), 77d).
" For a history of Regulation A, see generally 7 J. WILLIAM HICKS, EXEMPTED TRANSACTIONS
UNDER SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 §§ 6.2-6.4, (2d. ed. 2014); 3 LOuIS Loss &JOEL SELIGMAN,
SECURITIES REGULATION 1322-27 (3d ed. 1989).
sSecurities Act Release No. 627, 1936 WL 30895 Can. 21, 1936).
19Securities Act Release No. 2410, 1940 WL 7107, at *1-2 (Dec. 3, 1940). These amendments are
discussed in LOUIS LOSS, SECURITIES REGULATION 380-87 (1951).
0See HICKS, supra note 17, § 6.3.
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million and to add the "test the waters" provision. 2' Nonetheless, at the time the
JOBS Act became law in 2012, the core of the exemption provided by Regulation
A had been unchanged for decades.
Fundamentally, the Regulation A exemption was predicated on filing and
disclosure. Issuers relying on Regulation A were required to file an offering
statement (roughly similar to a registration statement in a registered offering) with
the Commission and provide investors with an offering circular (roughly similar to
a prospectus in a registered offering). 22 Both the offering statement and the offering
circular contained prescribed investment information that the Commission, over
2 3
time, had determined to be appropriate for these offerings by small businesses.
Because Regulation A offerings were designed for small businesses-the
exemption was limited to $5 million 24 and available only for issuers that were not
reporting under the 1934 Act25-- the Commission made an effort to scale back the
disclosure requirements from the more extensive disclosures required in a
registration statement under the 1933 Act.26 This was apparently in response to the
high relative offering costs encountered by small issuers searching for small
amounts of external capital. The Commission was also no doubt influenced by
Section 2(b) of the 1933 Act-enacted as a part of the National Securities Markets
Improvement Act of 1996 (NSMIA)-which required the Commission, in
enacting its rules governing capital formation, to "consider, in addition to the
protection of investors, whether the action will promote... capital formation. "27
It is significant in this brief look at the history of Regulation A to recall that at
the time the JOBS Act was signed into law, Regulation A was the only generally
available federal exemption from registration that enabled a small business to make
28
broad, interstate solicitations for external capital.
21Securities Act Release No. 6949, 57 Fed. Reg. 36,442 (Aug. 13, 1992). The "test the waters"
provision enabled issuers using Regulation A to solicit indications of interest from potential investors
before filing the offering statement with the Commission. 17 C.F.R § 230.254(a) (2012).
2 17 C.F.R. § 230.251(d) (2012).
23For an overview of the filing and disclosure requirements, see Campbell, A Moderate Capital,
supra note 9, at 104-06.
24 At the time of the passage of the JOBS Act, the Securities Act of 1933 limited Regulation A
offerings to $5 million. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b) (2011).
2 17 C.F.R. § 230.251(a)(2).
26

See id.; Campbell, A ModerateCapital,supra note 9, at 104-06 (discussing the nature and extent
of these disclosures).
27National Securities Market Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-290 § 106(b), 110 Stat..
3416, 3424-25 (1996) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77b(b) (2014)).

' For an explanation of why other federal exemptions of general availability were unavailable for
offers involving a broad, interstate solicitation for investors, see Campbell, A Moderate Capital,supra
note 9, at 92-99. Stated briefly and simply, the private placement exemption provided by Section 4(a)(2)
of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(2) (2014), was unavailable because it prohibited any public
solicitation for investors; the intrastate exemption provided by Rule 147, 17 C.F.R. § 230.147 (2015),
was unavailable because it prohibited any interstate solicitation for investors; and the exemptions

provided by Regulation D, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.504-.506, were unavailable because they prohibited any
general solicitation or general advertising. Campbell, A Moderate Capital,supra note 9, at 92-99.
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Notwithstanding the fact that there were approximately five million small
businesses with less than twenty employees and that the large majority of those
businesses needed external capital to survive and compete,29 in the decades before
the JOBS Act, Regulation A fell into nearly complete disuse.
Table I, immediately below, provides information regarding the use of
Regulation A in two recent time periods.
TABLE

130

Time Periods

Total Number of
Regulation A Offerings
During the Period

1/1/95 - 12/31/04
1/1/05- 1/1/11

78
162

Average Annual Number
of Regulation A
Offerings During the
Period
7.8
23.1

While this data may at first seem curious, the most apparent principal cause for
the non-use of Regulation A was state blue sky registration requirements. The
burden of meeting the registration requirements of the fifty states raised relative
offering costs associated with a Regulation A offering to an unbearable level for
small businesses.3'
The apparent purpose of Tide IV of the JOBS Act was to turn Regulation A
into a workable exemption for small business capital formation. Thus, the title of
Title IV of the JOBS Act is "Small Company Capital Formation."32
The strategy that Congress used to achieve this goal was to provide in Title IV
a skeletal statutory structure and then to delegate very broad authority to the
Commission to implement Title IV, including broad authority for the Commission
to preempt state registration authority over offerings made under the new
33
regulations.

29See generally Campbell, A Moderate Capital,supra note 9, at 84-88 (detailing historical data on
the number and nature of small businesses and small businesses' demand for external capital).
Campbell, Failure to Resuscitate,supra note 11, at 321.
31See Campbell, A Moderate Capital,supra note 9, at 106-12, 119-21.
32
Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, §§ 401-02, 126 Stat. 306,
323-25 (2012) (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.); Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, SEC
Adopts Rules to Facilitate Smaller Companies' Access to Capital (Mar. 25, 2015),
http://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-49.html.
33See 15 U.S.C § 77r(b)(4)(D)(ii) (2014) (preempting of state registration authority over securities
that are 'offered or sold to a qualified purchaser, as defined by the Commission").
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Il1.

OVERVIEW OF FINAL REGULATION

A+

RULES

Fundamentally, the Commission's final Regulation A+ amendments remain
philosophically consistent with the pre-JOBS Act Regulation A rules.34 Regulation
A+ continues as an exemption that is predicated on fding prescribed information
with the Commission and providing prescribed investment information to
investors. 35 The new rules, however, make significant changes from the pre-JOBS
Act Regulation A requirements.
To explain these changes and the nature of offerings likely to be conducted
under Regulation A+, it is helpful to emphasize two new definitions in Regulation
A+: Tier 1 offerings and Tier 2 offerings. The limit on a Tier 1 offering is $20
million, and the limit on a Tier 372 offering is $50 million. 6 There is no lower
amount limit for a Tier 2 offering.
The Commission in Regulation A+ establishes somewhat different
requirements for a Tier 1 offering and a Tier 2 offering. There are, however, a
number of important requirements that apply to both Tier 1 and Tier 2 offerings.
Consider first the more significant of these generally applicable requirements.
Both Tier 1 and Tier 2 offerings are subject to the same requirements regarding the
nature of the issuer that may use Regulation A+. These include the requirement
that the issuer is a United States or Canadian entity and, most importantly, the
requirement that the issuer is not a company subject to the reporting requirements
under the 1934 Act.

38

Regulation A+ provides both Tier 1 and Tier 2 offerings regulatory safe harbors
from integration. These include a safe harbor from integration with any prior
offering and a safe harbor from integration with any offering made six months after
the Regulation A+ offering.39

- Compare 17 C.F.R §§ 230.251-.263 (2015), with 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251-.263 (2011).

3117 C.F.R. §§ 230.251-.264 (2015).
36Id. § 230.251(a)(1)-(2). As proposed by the Commission, the upper limit of a Tier 1 offering was

$5 million in a twelve-month period. Proposed Rule Amendments for Small and Additional Issues
Exemptions Under Section 3(b) of the Securities Act, 79 Fed. Reg. 3926, 3936 (proposed Jan. 23, 2014)
(to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 230, 232, 239, 240, and 260) [hereinafter Proposed Regulation A+
Amendments].
37See 17 C.F.R. § 230.251(a)(2). This means that an issuer selling only $2 million in securities, for
example, may rely on the Tier 2 conditions for a Regulation A+ exemption, provided, of course, that the
issuer is able to meet all of the Tier 2 conditions.
31Id. § 230.251(b)(1)-(2). Under Section 13 of the 1934 Act, an issuer becomes subject to the
reporting requirements of the 1934 Act if it has a class of securities registered pursuant to Section 12 of
the 1934 Act. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291 § 13, 28 Stat. 881, 894-95
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a) (2014)). Under Section 12(g) of the 1934 Act, a company is required to
register any class of equity securities if the company has assets in excess of $10 million and either 2,000
shareholders of record or 500 unaccredited shareholders of record for the class of equity securities. Act
of Aug. 20, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-467 § 3(c), 78 Stat. 565, 566-68 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 781(g)
(2014)).
3917 C.F.R. § 230.251(c).
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All Regulation A+ offerings, no matter whether Tier 1 or Tier 2, are subject to
filing and disclosure requirements that, at least as a matter of process, are similar to
the filing and disclosure requirements of a registered offering.' Generally under
Regulation A+, no offers can be made until the offering statement has been filed.4
After the offering statement has been filed, the issuer can, for example, make oral
offers and offers through the use of a preliminary offering circular.4 2 Generally, only
after the offering statement is qualified (roughly equivalent to a final registration
statement that is declared effective by the Commission) is the issuer permitted to
43
sell the Regulation A+ securities.
Regulation A+ also retains, with some changes, the "test the waters" concept of
the pre-JOBS Regulation A, and this provision is also applicable to Tier 1 and Tier
2 offerings alike." This provision is an exception to the general prohibition in
Regulation A+ of pre-filing offers. Issuers may, under the final Regulation A+
rules, communicate with potential investors about the offering and seek from the
45
potential investors indications of interest in the proposed Regulation A+ offering.
These communications are expressly made subject to antifraud provisions and
require the offer to contain protective and informative legends and disclaimers.'
"Testing the water" communications may continue after filing the offering
statement, but during that period such communications must be accompanied by a
preliminary offering circular or provide the offeree with information as to where
4
such preliminary offering circular can be obtained. 1
Tier 1 offerings and Tier 2 offerings under Regulation A+ do, however, differ
in regard to the nature and extent of disclosure obligations. Broadly stated, Tier 2
offerings require significantly more disclosures than Tier 1 offerings, both at the
time of the offerings (ex ante disclosures) and following the completion of the
offering (ex post disclosures). This stepped or "scaled" approach 41 in Regulation A+
is an attempt by the Commission to balance investor protection and capital
formation, which is a statutory obligation of the Commission when it enacts
' Compare 17 C.F.R. § 230.251(d), with 15 U.S.C. § 77(e).
C.F.R. § 230.251(d)(1)(i).
42 Id. § 230.251(d).
41 17

- Id. § 230.251(d)(2)(i)(A).
44 See id. § 230.255(a). In the pre-JOBS era, this concept had become essentially unusable. The
reason was that state blue sky laws applied to pre-JOBS offerings under Regulation A, and such actions
as testing the waters were almost certain to run afoul of state registration provisions. See Campbell, A
Moderate Capital,supra note 9, at 110.
417 C.F.R. § 230.255(a).
See id. § 230.255(b). The required legends and disclaimers must inform the offeree, for example,
that no offer to buy can be accepted until the offering statement is qualified and that the offeree's
indication of interest creates no obligation to purchase. Id. § 230.255(b)(2)-(3).
47Id. § 230.255(b)(4).
' In earlier works, I used the term "stepped" for disclosures that vary according to the size of the
offering. Campbell, The Wreck ofRegulation D, supra note 8, at 926. The Commission uses the term
"scaled." E.g., Adopting Release Regulation A, supra note 3, at 21,830. 1 accede to the Commission's
wisdom on this matter and adopt the term "scaled" for the balance of this article.
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regulatory exemptions from the registration requirement of the 1933 Act.4 9 It
amounts to a sensible response to the stifling effect of relative offering costs on
50
small businesses' capital formation.
The ex ante narrative disclosures required in Tier 1 and Tier 2 offerings,
although somewhat different, 5 ' are to a large extent similar. There are fourteen
items of narrative disclosures required.5 2 These disclosures, while less than the
disclosures required in Form S-i, are nonetheless extensive and will certainly
impact the relative offering costs in a Regulation A+ offering, especially for smaller
53
offerings.
There are significant differences, however, between the financial disclosures
required in a Tier 1 offering and a Tier 2 offering, both with regard to ex ante and
ex post financial disclosures.
The requirements for ex ante financial disclosures in a Tier 1 offering are for
two years of financial statements (in some cases, interim statements may also be
required), but the statements do not have to be audited and do not have to be
prepared in compliance with Regulation S-X."4 The only ex post fiing or disclosure
for a Tier 1 offering is the obligation to file an "exit report" with the Commission
55
upon termination of the offering.
A Tier 2 offering, on the other hand, requires the issuer to file and disclose
significantly more financial information, both ex ante and ex post, than is required
in a Tier 1 offering. Ex ante, the principal difference from Tier 1 is that Tier 2
offerings must provide audited financial statements and meet the requirements of a
significant part of Regulation S-X. s6
An even more important difference in a Tier 2 offering is the ex post obligation
to continue to report narrative and financial information to the Commission in
filings that are reminiscent of the periodic reporting requirements found in the
1934 Act. Regulation A+ imposes on issuers utilizing Tier 2 the obligation to file
57
annual reports, semiannual reports, and current reports with the Commission.
These amount to significant obligations and may have a dramatic impact on
relative offering costs, especially for small Regulation A+ offerings. For example,
the annual report, which is filed on Form 1-K, in addition to extensive narrative
See 15 U.S.C. § 77b(b) (2014).
so See supra notes 13-15 and accompanying text.
s See, e.g., Adopting Release Regulation A, supra note 3, at 21,828, 21,830 (discussing the
compensation disclosure requirements in Item 11 of the Offering Circular requirements).
2 Form 1-A: Regulation A Offering Statement Under the Securities Act of 1933, at 10-23 (2015),
http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/forml-a.pdf [hereinafter Form 1-A]; see also Adopting Release
Regulation A, supra note 3, at 21,903-13.
" See Campbell, The Impact ofJOBS, supra note 14, at 840-43.
14Form 1-A, supra note 52, at Part F/S(b).
" See Adopting Release Regulation A, supra note 3, at 21,899. This is filed on a simple form that
requires no financial statements. Form 1-Z, Exit Report Under Regulation A (2015),
https://www.sec.gov/about/forms/forml-z.pdf.
s Form 1-A, supra note 52, at Part F/S(c).
Adopting Release Regulation A, supra note 3, at 21,899.
49
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disclosures about the company's business and management's discussion and analysis
of financial condition, requires two years of audited financial statements that are
compliant with a significant portion of Regulation S-X. ss
Importantly, this obligation of periodic reporting continues until such time as
the issuer becomes subject to the reporting requirements under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 or the securities of the issuer are held by less than 300
shareholders of record. 9 In all events, the issuer is required to go through one
6
annual cycle of reporting, even if the issuer has less than 300 shareholders. 0
Finally, the most significant difference between Tier 1 and Tier 2 offerings is
that Regulation A+ preempts state authority over registration in Tier 2 offerings
but does not preempt state authority over registration in Tier 1 offerings.
As originally proposed, the Commission had preempted state authority over
Tier 2 offerings and had offered what was an unworkable compromise with regard
to preemption over Tier 1 offerings. Specifically, the Commission had proposed
that in Tier 1 offerings, state authority over registration be preempted with regard
to offers but not with regard to sales. 6' This, upon reflection, appeared to be an
63
unworkable compromise 62 and was not part of the final version of Regulation A+.
In the final rules, states continue to exercise authority over registration in Tier 1
offerings.
It is worth noting that the battle over preemption was robust and fought out on
various fronts. The Commission's release adopting Regulation A+ devotes a
significant amount of space to recounting the spirited debate and tactics deployed
in the effort to preserve state authority over registration of Regulation A+ offerings
and to explain its final reckoning on the matter. 64 Not surprisingly, this effort was
principally from state regulators and NASAA. 61 United States Senators and
" See Form 1-K: Annual Reports and Special Financial Reports, at 4-5, Part II, Item 1, 2, 7
(2015), http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/forml-k.pdf; Form 1-A, supra note 52, at Item 7, 9(a)-(b),
(d).
See Adopting Release Regulation A, supra note 3, at 21,899-900.
Adopting Release Regulation A, supra note 3, at 21,853. The issuer's ability to extricate itself
from the periodic reporting requirements of Regulation A+ will be significant in regard whether small
businesses making smaller offerings will migrate to Tier 2 offerings. See infra note 123 and
accompanying text.
61The JOBS Act amended the preemption in NSMIA by preempting state registration authority
over Regulation A+ securities "offered or sold to a qualified purchaser, as defined by the Commission..
. .. 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(4)(D)(ii) (2014). In the Commission's initial proposed Regulation A+ rules,
proposed Rule 256 stated: "For the purposes of Section 18(b)(3) of the Securities Act [15 U.S.C. §
77r(b)(3)], a 'qualified purchaser' of a security offered or sold pursuant to Regulation A means any
offeree of such security and, in a Tier 2 offering, any purchaser of such security." Proposed Regulation
A+ Amendments, supra note 36, at 4003.
62See Campbell, The Impact oFJOBS, supra note 14, at 845-47.
63 The final version of Rule 256 states: "[A] 'qualified purchaser' means any person to whom
securities are offered or sold pursuant to a Tier 2 offering of this Regulation A." Adopting Release
Regulation A, supra note 3, at 21,899.
64 See id. at 21,856-62.
65Id. at 21,857 n.772 (citing letters from NASAA and individual state regulators)

2015-2016]

The SEC's Regulation A+

Representatives were also convinced to write letters in support of continuing state
66
registration authority over Regulation A+ offerings.
In addition to attacking the Commission's authority to preempt state
registration authority over Regulation A+ offerings, NASAA-following the
publication of the Commission's proposed Regulation A+ rules-adopted a multistate coordinated review program for offerings under Regulation A+ and reported
that forty-nine of NASAA's fifty-three members had agreed to participate in the
67
program.
These strategies may have provided the incentive for a compromise by the
Commission and its final decision to withdraw any preemption of state registration
authority over Tier 1 offerings. Even this, however, was not enough to satisfy state
regulators, and on May 22, 2015, a suit was filed asking the court to issue a
permanent6 injunction against the preemption of state authority over Tier 2
offerings. 8
IV. A CRITICAL EVALUATION OF THE COMMISSION'S FINAL
REGULATION A+ RULES: DO THE RULES PROMOTE EFFICIENT
AND FAIR "SMALL COMPANY CAPITAL FORMATION"?

69

A. Overview
The Commission's Regulation A+ rules will do little for small businesses.
Neither the Tier 1 regime nor the Tier 2 regime offers small issuers an efficient
access to external capital. It is unlikely that small businesses will make Tier 1
offerings, because there is no preemption of state registration authority for Tier 1
offerings. Migration to Tier 2 solves the state registration problems for small
businesses, but it may increase small issuers' relative offering costs to an intolerable
level.
These predictions of an unfortunate, inefficient, and seemingly unintended
outcome for the Commission's final Regulation A+ rules are based on the history
one finds regarding Regulation A, Regulation D, and NASAA's attempts to corral
states into coordinated actions regarding states' registration provisions.
B. Tier 1 Offerings: Nothing Has Changed
Prior to the JOBS Act, Regulation A had fallen into nearly total disuse. This
disuse is reflected in Table I in Section II of this article.7" The data in Table I
IId. (citing letters from United States Congressmen and Senators).

67 Id. at

21,860-61, 21,861 n.826.

" See Petition for Review, Galvin v. SEC, No. 15-1150 (D.C. Cir. May 22,2015).
69 Title IV of JOBS is entitled "Small Company Capital Formation." Jumpstart Our Business
Startups (JOBS) Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, §§ 401-02, 126 Stat. 306, 323-24 (2012) (codified in
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
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become even more dramatic when one realizes that during the years covered by the
Table there were about five million small businesses in the United States, 71 and
most of those businesses needed external capital to survive and compete. 72
One may speculate, of course, that some small businesses may have been
reluctant to use Regulation A because of the requirements for constructing and
filing an offering statement with the Commission and constructing and providing
an offering circular to investors. Small issuers may also have had a general fear of
getting tangled up with the Commission. The Commission, however, took steps to
ameliorate those concerns by scaling back the expensive disclosure requirements for
Regulation A-especially as concerned financial disclosures-in a manner that
should have made Regulation A popular for offerings in excess of $1 million.73
The most apparent principal culprit in the failure of Regulation A was state
registration requirements. The niche for Regulation A was public offerings: the
ability of firms in Regulation A offerings to make broad, interstate solicitations for
capital. But state registration obligations seemingly destroyed that space. The five
million small businesses in the United States apparently were unwilling to
underwrite the costs of complying with the registration requirements of fifty states,
74
each with its own individual registration regime.
The regime under Tier 1 changes nearly nothing for small businesses.7" Issuers
utilizing Tier 1 are still required to file an offering statement with the Commission
and to provide an offering circular to investors, 76 and-most importantly-the Tier
1 issuers are still required to meet the registration requirements of all states in
which they conduct an offering. 77 Since nothing has changed, one should not

7 See supra Table I. For Regulation A data covering periods before that reflected in Table I, see
HICKS, supra note 17, at § 6.3, tbls.2, 2.1 (providing data on the use of Regulation A for most years
from 1947 through 1988).
71 For historical data on the number and nature of small businesses and small businesses' demand
for external capital, see Campbell, A Moderate Capital,supra note 9, at 84-88.
72 See id. at 86-87 ("Data show that slightly over 85% of firms with ten to nineteen employees
utilize some form of credit as a source for financing. That number increases to slightly over 90% for
firms employing between twenty and ninety-nine persons.").
73See id. at 101-06.
74
See U.S. GOv'" ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-12-839, SECURITIES REGULATION: FACTORS
THAT
MAY
AFFECT
TRENDS
IN
REGULATION
A
OFFERINGS
(2012),
http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/592113.pdf [hereinafter GAO REPORT]. In its adopting release, the
Commission reported that the GAO "found that state securities laws were among several central factors
that may have contributed to the lack of use of Regulation A." Adopting Release Regulation A, supra
note 3, at 21,856.
7 In fact, the financial disclosure requirements for a Tier 1 offering are, at least to some degree,
even more demanding than the requirements for a pre-JOBS Act Regulation A offering. For example,
the pre-JOBS Act offering circular required only one year's financial statements. See 17 C.F.R. § 239.90
(2011); Form 1-A, supra note 52, at Part F/S; Tier 1 offering under the Commission's final Regulation
A+ rules requires two years' financial statements. Id.
76 See 17 C.F.R §§ 230.251(d), .252, .253 (2015); see Form 1-A, supra note 52, at Part F/S.
- See 17 C.F.R. § 230.256 (2015) (limiting preemption to Tier 2 offerings).
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expect a different outcome, and it seems highly unlikely, therefore, that small
business will, to any meaningful degree, utilize Tier 1 offerings.
C. Inefficient Options for Small Businesses to Meet State Registration
Requirementsin Tier 1 Offerings.
As is always the case, there are options for how small businesses making a Tier
1 offering can meet state registration requirements. Even the best of those options,
however, is unworkable for small businesses that wish to use Regulation A+.
1. NASAA's New Coordinated Review Program for Regulation A+
Offerings-The JOBS Act was signed into law in April of 2012, and it offered the
Commission, once again,7 8 the opportunity to preempt state registration authority
over Section 3(b) offerings, specifically in this case, Regulation A+ offerings. 79
Indeed, such a targeted, statutory restatement of the Commission's authority could
be viewed as strong evidence that Congress intended for the Commission to do
something this time.
In what appears to have been a strategic response, NASAA published a release
in October of 2013 requesting comments on a new Proposed Coordinated Review
Program for Section 3(b)(2) (Regulation A+ Coordinated Review). ° This NASAA
proposal was in place at the time the Commission first proposed its Regulation A+
rules in January 2014.1 NASAA subsequently reported that forty-nine of its fifty8 2
three members had signed on to participate in the coordinated review program.
Under this Regulation A+ Coordinated Review, an issuer can file a single state
registration statement, which will then be circulated to all states participating in the
coordinated review program. 3 The registration statement is first reviewed by one
78In 1996, NSMIA delegated authority to the Commission to expand preemption by regulation for
any offering of securities "to qualified purchasers, as defined by the Commission by rule." National
Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-290 § 18(b)(3), 110 Stat. 3416, 3418
(1996) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(3) (2014)). The Act continued by stating: "the
Commission may define the term 'qualified purchaser' differently with respect to different categories of
securities, consistent with the public interest and the protection of investors." Id. Prior to the enactment
of the JOBS Act, the Commission had never used that authority for any meaningful regulatory
expansion of preemption over exempt offerings.
71See 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(4)(D).
" Notice of Request for Public Comment: Proposed CoordinatedReview Program for Section
3(b)(2), NASAA, (Oct. 30, 2013), http://www.nasaa.org/27427/notice-request-public-commentproposed-coordinated-review-program-section 2-offerings/.
81 See id.; Proposed Regulation A+ Amendments, supra note 36.
82 See Adopting Release Regulation A, supra note 3, at 21,861 n.826. NASAA members include
states, territories and the District of Columbia. About Us, NASAA, http://www.nasaa.org/about-us/
(last visited Dec. 27, 2015).
"3NASAA Coordinated Review of Regulation A Offerings: Review Protocol, NASAA, (Mar. 7,
2014), http://www.nasaa.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/NASAA-Regulation-A-Review-Protocolfinal-Adopted-March-7.pdf [hereinafter NASAA CoordinatedReview Protocoll.
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lead state for compliance with disclosure matters.8 4 A second lead state is appointed
to deal with merit qualifications if any of the states involved in the offering also are
subject to merit regulation."5 The lead state or states prepare comments on the
registration statement (both regarding matters of disclosure and merit standards)
that are then circulated to all the other participating states.86 Each of the
participating state or states, in turn, has the right to make its own comments and
return the comments to the lead state or states.8 7 The lead state or states then
forward the combined comments to the issuer, who, in the usual manner in which
these matters are resolved, is required to work with all states to resolve matters
raised by each of the states' comments. 8 The lead state or states are the go between
89
and mediator to facilitate the resolution of each states' comments with the issuer.
Not surprisingly, a number of the comments offered on the Commission's
proposed Regulation A+ rules expressed strong doubts that the Regulation A+
Coordinated Review program could provide a workable regime for small businesses
to meet blue sky registration provisions in the fifty states. 90 Commenters pointed
out that even if all states participated in the programs, each state's laws remained
applicable to an offering in each state. 9 Commenters expressed concerns about
delays and expenses and generally about getting tangled with the large number of
sovereign state regulators with different legal rules. 92 Thus, for example, in the
states that apply merit requirements, each state's individual merit requirements
must be met, and as the GAO Report emphasized, merit requirements vary from
state to state. 93 It would also seem that the "test the waters" 9 4 provision of
Regulation A+ would cause trouble for offerings in particular states, since all
matters regarding "offers" and "sales" still remain a matter of each state's laws.
84

Id.

s5The GAO Report states that "most states.., conduct merit reviews." GAO REPORT, supra note

74, at 13. The Report goes on to discuss the significant differences in merit standards among the states.
Id. at 14 ("Merit reviews have varying degrees of stringency, with some states applying stricter standards
than others.").
86 NASAA CoordinatedReview Protocol,supra note 83, at 2.
87

Id.

8

Id.

" See id. ("The lead examiners will communicate with the applicant and participating jurisdictions,
as necessary, to resolve any outstanding comments.").
o See, e.g., Catherine T. Dixon, Comment Letter on Proposed Regulation A+ Amendments, (Apr.

3, 2014), http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-11-13/s71113-99.pdf [hereinafter ABA BLS Letter];
Robert R. Kaplan, Jr. & T. Rhys James, Comment Letter on Proposed Regulation A+ Amendments,
(March 23, 2014), http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-11-13/s71113-89.pdf [hereinafter KVCF Letter];
Michael L. Zuppone, Comment Letter on Proposed Regulation A+ Amendments, (March 24, 2014),
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-11-13/s71113-73.pdf [hereinafter Hastings Letter].
91See, e.g., KVCF Letter, supra note 90.
92See, e.g., id.; Hastings Letter, supra note 90.
The GAO Report states that "[m]erit reviews have varying degrees of stringency, with some
states applying stricter standards than others." GAO REPORT, supra note 74, at 14. This point was also
emphasized by a commenter. See ABA BLS Letter, supra note 90.
9417 C.F.R1 § 230.254 (2015).
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Commenters also emphasized that each state retained the right to charge
registration fees for its state. 95 This generates both out of pocket expenses for the
state fees and legal expenses in determining the amount and required process for
paying those fees.
If one overlays such concerns and issues on the process described above, one
sees that NASAA's Regulation A+ Coordinated Review program is unlikely to
attract a significant amount of use from small businesses making Tier 1 offerings
under Regulation A+. History also supports this conclusion.
Over the decades, state regulators and NASAA have made attempts at
uniformity. These initiatives have, at best, appeared to enjoy modest success. For
example, NASAA's Uniform Limited Offering Exemption (ULOE)9 ' was
designed to permit a uniform state regime for coordination of some Regulation D
offerings with state blue sky laws and was widely adopted by states. 97 It turned out,
however, that the ULOE provisions varied significantly from state to state.9"
In a 2000 article, I gathered and presented data regarding NASAA's Small
Company Offering Registration initiative (SCOR), relying on a ten state sample. 99
NASAA described SCOR as designed to "provide for the uniform treatment of
registrations of small company offerings which are exempt from federal registration
under Rule 504 of Regulation D, Regulation A, or Rule 147."" ° While my research
indicated that states had widely adopted SCOR, that research also suggested that
SCOR was less than uniform across states and had barely been utilized by
01
issuers.
9'See, e.g., Hastings Letter, supra note 90.
9' See generally Reg D/ULOE: Uniform Limited Offering Exemption, NASAA Rep. (CCH)
6201, at 6101 (Apr. 29, 1989).

97
JurisdictionsAdopting the Uniform Security Act, 1 Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) 5500 (Aug.
2004); Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr., The Insidious Remnants of State Rules Respecting Capital

Formation,78 WASH. U.L. REV. 407, 419 (2000) [hereinafter Campbell, The Insidious Remnants].

9' See Therese H. Maynard, The Uniform Limited Offering Exemption: How "Uniform" is
"Uniform?"-An Evaluation and Critique of the ULOE, 36 EMORY L.J. 357, 389-95 (1987). As

Professor Maynard notes:
The ULOE was intended to ease [the] burden by providing a uniform exemption
in all fifty states which would also coordinate with Regulation D. In actual
practice, however, the ULOE has not achieved its goal. The modifications made

by the NASAA member states have resulted in the same confusing array of
exemptive requirements that existed prior to the ULOE.
Id. at 504.
" See Campbell, The Insidious Remnants, supra note 97, at 420, 423. For my sample states, I

selected Kentucky and other states falling close to Kentucky alphabetically. Id. at 420 n.52. Much of the
data I used was gathered from individual states, since I was at that time unable to find any centralized
source for the data.

o SCOR Statement of Policy, NASAA, (Apr. 28, 1996), http://www.nasaa.org/industryresources/corporation-finance/scor-overview/scor-statement-of-policy/.
"' See Campbell, The Insidious Remnants, supra note 97, at 424. ("Iowa reports that only four

SCOR registration statements became effective ... during each of the calendar years 1997, 1998, and
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More recent data show that SCOR registrations continue rarely to be used.
SCOR filings can now be filed centrally within multi-state regions or with
individual states. The total number of central filings of SCOR registration
statements in all regions during more recent periods were: three in 2012; three in
2013; and one in 2014.102 The total number of individual state filings during those
periods from a nine state sample were: four in 2012; four in 2013; and one in
2014.103

In my 2000 article, I also looked at NASAA's Coordinated Equity Review
initiative, and found similar results as with SCOR: participating states retained
sovereignty over rules respecting offers and sales of securities, and the small amount
of information available suggested that Coordinated Equity Review was very lightly
used by issuers. 10 4 Recently I updated this data and found that during the three
05
years 2012-2014, only one Coordinated Equity Review was filed.1
My data regarding the use of SCOR and Coordinated Equity Review are
consistent with softer anecdotal evidence. For example, evidence gathered for the
2012 GAO Report from state securities administrators suggests that usage of such
uniformity initiatives has been insignificant with regard to any Regulation A
06
offerings.1
1999. Indiana reports that only two SCOR registration statements became effective between January,
1997 and August, 1999. Information gathered from other sample states reflects similarly modest
utilization of SCOR.").
102 Email from Joy Sakamoto-Wengel, Assistant Attorney Gen., Md. Div. of Sec., Atd. CR-SCOR
Region, to author (Nov. 20, 2015, 15:10 EST) (on file with author); Telephone interview with Lynn
Hammes, Dir., Fin. &Admin., Kan. Sec. Comm'r's Office, Midwest CR-SCOR Region, (Nov. 19,
2015); Telephone interview with Patricia Loutherback, Dir., Registration Div., Tex. State Sec. Bd., Sw.
CR-SCOR Region, (Nov. 19, 2015); Telephone interview with Sarah Reynolds, Div. of Sec., Wash.
State Dep't of Fin. Insts., W. CR-SCOR Region, (Nov. 19,2015).
10 Out of the ten sample states used in my 2000 article, we were able to get data on nine of the
states. Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, and Maryland, had zero SCOR filings in 2012,
2013, and 2014. Email from Patrick Sanders, Registrations Attorney, Ind. Sec. Div., to author (Jan. 13,
2016) (on file with author); Telephone interview with Steven Wassom, Exec. Dir., Kan. Sec. Comm'r's
Office (Dec. 22, 2015); Telephone interview with Anthony Murphy, Registration Branch Manager,
Div. of Sec., Ky. Dep't of Fin. Insts. (Jan. 6, 2016); Telephone interview with Len Riviere, Deputy
Chief Exam'r, Sec. Div., La. Office of Fin. Insts. (Dec. 28, 2015); Telephone interview with Paige
Turney, Assistant Sec. Admin'r, Office of Sec., Me. Dep't of Profl and Fin. Regulation (Dec. 28,
2015); Email from Joy Sakamoto-Wengel, supra note 102.
Iowa and Michigan both had one filing in 2013 but zero in 2012 and 2014. Email from Mich.
Dep't of Licensing and Regulatory Affairs (LARA), to author (Jan. 13, 2016) (on file with author);
Telephone interview with Tom Alberts, Dire., Corp. Fin., Iowa Sec. Bureau (Dec.22, 2015). Illinois
had the most SCOR filings with two in 2012, two in 2013, and one in 2014. Email from David
Finnigan, Senior Enft Attorney, Ill. Sec. Dep't, to author (Dec. 22, 2015, 11:58 EST) (on file with
author).
104 Campbell, The Insidious Remnants, supra note 97, at 425-27, 426 n.93 (only two coordinated
reviews by 1997, and only seventeen coordinated review offerings had become effective by 1999).
155Telephone interview with Brett Warren, Counsel, Div. of Corp. Fim., Pa. Sec. Comm'n (Dec.
28, 2015).
106GAO REPORT, supra note 74, at 15 ("According to several of the state securities administrators.
they have not participated in regional reviews or used SCOR forms for Regulation A filings because
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Finally, preliminary data suggest that NASAA's newly minted Regulation A+
Coordinated Review program will have limited appeal for issuers, especially small
issuers. The Regulation A+ final regulations became effective on June 19, 2015.
Between that date and May 24, 2016, only 37 Tier 1 Regulation A+ offerings were
A+
filed with the Commission. 1 7 As ofJune 2, 2016, only eleven Tier 1 Regulation
08
filings had utilized NASAA's Regulation A+ Coordinated Review program.
In summary, history supports the conclusion that NASAA's Regulation A+
Coordinated Review initiative will not solve the problems of small businesses in
Tier 1 offerings under Regulation A+.
2. Migration of Tier 1 Offerings to the Tier 2 Regime-It is possible for
offerings by small businesses within the amount limit of Tier 1 to migrate to a Tier
2 offering, since there is no lower amount limitation on Tier 2 offerings under
Regulation A+.1'9 Some small businesses seeking an amount of external capital
within the Tier 1 limit, therefore, may be tempted to try to solve their state
registration problems by migrating to a Tier 2 offering, because the Regulation A+
rules preempt state registration authority over Tier 2 offerings." 0 Similar strategies
have been extensively employed by small businesses in Regulation D offerings."'
Rule 504 is a Regulation D exemption from registration that is designed for
and attractive to small businesses seeking small amounts of capital."12 The
exemption allows small businesses to offer up to $1 million in securities,"' and it
does not require disclosures or any offeree or purchaser qualifications (such as

there have been so few Regulation A filings in their state. Similarly .... some of these methods, like
SCOR, have not been widely used because of the low number of Regulation A filings in recent years.").
While these data may appear thin, this anecdotal evidence suggests that such uniformity initiatives have
not been able to overcome the negative effect of state registration rules on Regulation A offerings.
107Regulation A+ data were obtained from the subscription-only Lexis Securities Mosaic website.
See Form 1-A Data, LEXIS SEC. MOSAIC, www.lexissecuritiesmosaic.com (last visited May 24, 2016)
(click "SEC Filings" tab; then follow "SEC Filings" hyperlink; then search "Form 1-A").
During that same period there were twenty-five Tier 2 offerings of less than $20 million, a range in
which issuers could have relied on Tier 1 rules. Id.
108Following the passage of the JOBS Act, NASAA adopted a new coordinated review regime for
offerings under Regulation A+. NASAA CoordinatedReview Protocol,supra note 83, at 1.
NASAA reported that the regime had been adopted by forty-nine of its fifty-three members.
Adopting Release Regulation A, supra note 3, at 21,861 n.826; 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251-.263 (2015). As
of June 2, only eleven coordinated reviews had been filed with the states. Email from Faith L.
Anderson, Esq., Chief of Registration & Regulatory Affairs, Wash. Dep't of Fin. Insts. Sec. Div., to
author (June 2, 2016, 5:17 PM EST) (on file with author).
1o9See 17 C.F.R. § 230.251(a)(2) (2015). The only amount limitation on a Tier 2 offering is that
the offering cannot "exceed $50,000,000." Id.
11o
See id. § 230.256.
1 See Campbell, The Wreck ofRegulation D, supra note 8, at 933-36.
112 See 17 C.F.R. § 230.504.
113
The Commission has proposed raising the limit of Rule 504 to $5 million. See Exemptions to
Facilitate Intrastate and Regional Securities Offerings, Securities Act Release No. 9973, Exchange Act
Release No. 76319, 2015 WL 6662108 (October 30,2015).
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gophistication or accredited investor status).1 4 On the other hand, Rule 506,
another Regulation D exemption, provides an exemption that is unlimited in
amount but may require either accredited investors or significant disclosures of
n5
prescribed investment information, or both.
Notwithstanding the additional burdens and compliance costs, small offerings
under Regulation D within the $1 million limit of Rule 504 overwhelmingly
migrate to Rule 506.116 Data show that approximately 80% of Regulation D
offerings of $1 million or less are made as Rule 506 offerings. 7 Issuers migrated
from Rule 504 in order to solve their state blue sky problems, since NSMIA
preempts state registration authority over offerings under Rule 506. 118
Migrating to Rule 506, however, has costs for the issuer. One possible cost in
moving from a Rule 504 offering to a Rule 506 offering is the expense of extensive
disclosures that may be required in a Rule 506 offering." 9 These disclosures,
however, are not required if the Rule 506 offering is limited to accredited
investors.' 2 0 Not surprisingly, therefore, one finds that the vast majority of offerings
that migrate from Rule 504 to Rule 506 are limited to accredited investors. Thus,
in a sample I constructed and used in prior research, I found that 88% of Rule 506
21
offerings of $1 million or less were limited to accredited investors.'
The net of this is that in small Regulation D offerings, the principal cost of
migrating to a Rule 506 offering is the cost of limiting the offering to accredited
investors. While this certainly amounts to a significant reduction in the pool of
investors, 12 2 the out of pocket expenses-for example, legal and accounting costsin moving to a Rule 506 offering may not be great.
Under Regulation A+, however, the costs of migration to a Tier 2 offering are
different from the Regulation D migration and would seem to be significantly more
daunting for a small issuer attempting to raise a relatively small amount of capital.
Most important here are the additional disclosure requirements generated by
1 14

Id.

115Id. §

230.506. For an overview of Rule 504 and Rule 506, see generally Campbell, The Wreck of
Regulation D, supra note 8, at 923-26.
116See Campbell, The Wreck of Regulation D, supra note 8, at 928. A recent article by Professor
Manning Warren shows the relatively small number of Regulation D offerings that utilize Rule 504 or
Rule 505. Manning Gilbert Warren III, The False Promise of Publicly Offered Private Placements, 68
SMU L. REV. 899, 903 fig.1 (2015) (noting that out of a sample of 33,440 Regulation D filings, only
450 were Rule 504 offerings and only 825 were Rule 505 offerings).
117Id. tbl.Ill.
11'See 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(4)(E) (2014).
119See 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(b).
120Id. § 230.502(b)(1).
121Campbell, The Wreck of Regulation D, supra note 8, at 930 tbl.VII.
122While it is difficult to be precise, data suggest that accredited investors may amount to 3% to 5%
of the population. An analysis of Internal Revenue Service data shows that approximately 3.62 percent
of all 2012 tax returns reported income of $200,000 or more. Justin Bryan, High-Income Tax Returns
for 2012, IRS STAT. INCOME BULL., Spring 2015, at 4, fig. C. For tax year 2007, see Justin Bryan,
High-Income Tax Returns for 2007, SOI BULLETIN, Spring 2010, at 4 fig.A (noting that 3.172 percent
of all 2007 tax returns reported income of $200,000 or more).
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moving to the Tier 2 regime. As described above in Section III, ex ante disclosures,
especially the financial disclosures, are significantly more demanding, and thus
more expensive, in a Tier 2 offering. 123 But more off-putting for a small issuer are
the ex post disclosure requirements, which may require periodic filings with
extensive narrative and financial disclosures for years to come.
There is also the matter of the opportunity costs in migrating to a Tier 2
offering. Faced with the practical loss of Tier 1 offerings due to continuing state
authority over registration, there may be other opportunities that are more
attractive for the small issuer that needs to make a broad solicitation for external
capital. A more likely migration for small issuers foreclosed from Tier 1 offerings
may be-as it was for Rule 504-to a Rule 506 offering limited to accredited
investors. Under new Rule 506(c), if limited to accredited investors, a small issuer
may offer its securities through a general solicitation and sell to an unlimited
number of purchasers. 124 Rule 506(c) imposes no mandated disclosure requirements
or offeree qualification requirements 25 (such as sophistication), and state
registration authority over Rule 506(c) offerings is preempted. 126 It may seem more
likely that small issuers precluded from Tier 1 offerings would migrate to Rule
506(c), not to Tier 2.
Preliminary data suggest that few small offerings under Regulation A+ will
migrate from a Tier 1 offering to Tier 2 offering. From June 19, 2015, the
effective date for the Regulation A+ rules, to May 24, 2016, only twenty-five
Regulation A+ offerings of $20 million or less-offerings that could have been filed
under the Tier 1 regime instead-were filed as Tier 2 offerings.'27
In summary, it is difficult to see how Regulation A+ will materially benefit
small issuers searching for a small amount of external capital. For such businesses
using the Tier 1 regime under the new Regulation A+ rules, essentially nothing has
changed. The requirements and impediments faced by issuers using Tier 1 are
fundamentally the same as the requirements and impediments faced by issuers
using Regulation A in its pre-JOBS Act form. Migration to Tier 2 for such small
offerings by small businesses seems likely to generate unacceptably high offering
and post offering costs and thus does not appear to be an attractive path for small
businesses to solicit broadly for external capital.

123See supra notes 48-59 and accompanying text.
124See 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(c).
1

See id.

1 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(4)(E) (2014).
127Regulation A+ data were obtained from the subscription-only Lexis Securities Mosaic website.

See Form 1-A Data, LEXIS SEC. MOSAIC, www.lexissecuritiesmosaic.com (last visited May 24, 2016)
(click "SEC Filings" tab; then follow "SEC Filings" hyperlink; then search "Form 1-A").
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V. WHO WILL USE REGULATION A+? IS THE OUTCOME BAD?
Although Regulation A+ may not work well for small issuers seeking relatively
small amounts of external capital, as the size of the offering increases, Tier 2
offerings under Regulation A+ may become more attractive. Relative transaction
costs decrease as the size of the offering increases, and thus the expenses associated
with the Tier 2 disclosure requirements become less of an impediment to financing.
The most significant limitation on the availability of Regulation A+ for these
larger Tier 2 offerings is that the issuer cannot be a reporting company under the
1934 Act. 2 ' The niche for Regulation A+ offerings, therefore, seems likely to be
for offerings by businesses with the need for significant amounts of external
capital-perhaps amounts between $5 million and $50 million-provided that
those businesses are not subject to the reporting requirements of section 13(a)129 or
131
3°
section 15(d)' of the 1934 Act.
One point of this discussion is to recognize that there may be a niche for Tier 2
offerings, although the niche is likely limited to a group of larger privately and
semi-privately owned companies.1 3 2 The existence of this limited niche, however,
does not change the fundamental fact that Regulation A+ is unlikely to provide any
material relief for small businesses searching for small amounts of external capital.
Still, one may question whether denying small businesses access to Regulation A+
is significant. One might, for example, point out that small businesses are no worse
off than they were before Regulation A+.
My view is that the Commission's failure is significant. The Commission, by its
failure to make Regulation A+ available to small businesses with smaller capital
needs, missed the opportunity offered by the JOBS Act to construct a much better
overall exemption regime for small businesses.
Considered as a whole, the JOBS Act, although certainly not without its

challenges to regulatory implementation, offered the Commission the opportunity
'- 17 C.F.R. § 230.251(a)(2) (establishing that Regulation A+ is available only if the "issuer... [i]s
not subject to section 13 or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ...immediately before the
offering.").
' 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a) (2011).
'3015 U.S.C. § 78o(d) (2014).
131 One might also assume that many or most of the issuers considering a Tier 2 offering would
be
unwilling to make the offering under Regulation A+ if as a result the company became subject to the
1934 Act. Under § 12(g) of the 1934 Act, companies generally are required to file a registration
statement with the Commission and thus become subject to the provisions of the 1934 Act when they
have $10 million in assets and 500 shareholders of record that are not accredited investors. 15 U.S.C. §
78
1(g) (2014).
132As previously described, a petition for review was filed with the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit asking for a permanent injunction regarding the preemption of
state registration authority over securities sold under Regulation A+. See Petition for Review, Galvin v.
SEC, No. 15-1150 (D.C. Cir. May 22, 2015). A successful challenge to the preemption over Tier 2
offerings would, of course, significandy limit the use of Regulation A+ for larger offerings within the
$50 million limit of the exemption.
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to construct three essentially new and rational paths for small business capital
formation. Title II opened the way for a broad solicitation of accredited investors
under Rule 506.133 Rule 506(c) now permits a broad solicitation for investors,
imposing the investor protection provision-which is the accredited status of the
investors-at the point of purchase.1 34 The correct implicit assumption of this is
that no material harm to investors results from the broad solicitation, so long as the
purchasersmeet the accredited investor requirement.
Title III of JOBS opened the way for internet offerings of up to $1 million
through a technique referred to as crowdfunding, but subject to the disclosure of
investment information to investors.1 35 Essentially, this permits small issuers to post
their offerings on the internet but prohibits any other sales activities.
The third leg of the JOBS Act for small business capital formation is Title IV,
and it is an important complement to Title II and Title III. Tide IV permits broad
solicitation for investors, does not limit purchasers to accredited investors, and
allows the use of traditional and usual selling efforts and techniques, but subject to
136
prescribed, scaled disclosures.
Without a viable Title IV, the JOBS Act limits small businesses to selling to
accredited investors, which amounts to a small percentage of the population, and
the passive posting of offers on the internet. There is, in short, no way under the
JOBS Act for small businesses to raise a small amount of capital through traditional
marketing techniques that have always been and will always be at the heart of small
business capital formation.
VI. WHO IS TO BLAME? WHO CAN FIX THE PROBLEM?

NASAA and the Commission are two obvious parties to blame for what
appears to be a subversion of the legislative intent of Title IV, which apparently
was to provide an efficient exemption from registration for small offerings by small
businesses.
NASAA and its members have long and with remarkable success fought
preemption of state authority over registration, especially as it relates to exempt
offerings by small businesses. NASAA and state regulators, for example, mounted a
successful fight in the adoption process for the National Securities Market
Improvement Act of 1996 (NSMIA)137 to limit materially NSMIA's preemption of
state registration authority over exempt offerings."3 ' NSMIA, which was originally
...
See Campbell, The Impact ofJOBS, supra note 14 at 825-30.
1- 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(a)-(c) (2015).
'3' 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(b) (2011); see also Campbell, The Impact ofJOBS, supra note 14 at 830-39.
13617 C.F.R. § 230.251; see also Campbell, The Impact ofJOBS, supra note 14, at 839-47.
137 National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-290, 110 Stat. 3416
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 and 29 U.S.C.).
13' See Capital Markets Deregulation and Liberalization Act of 1995: Hearing on H.R. 2131
Before the Subcomm. On Telcomms. &Fin. of the H. Comm. on Commerc4 104th Cong. 307 (1996)
[hereinafter Hearingon H.R. 2131] (statement of Dee R. Harris, President, North American Securities
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introduced as the Capital Markets Deregulation and Liberalization Act of 1995,139
in its original form would have preempted all state registration authority over
exempt offerings, except for shares offered under the federal intrastate
exemption. 4° As enacted, however, NSMIA had significantly more limited
preemption and, most importantly, did not preempt state authority over offerings
4
under Section 3(b) of the 1933 Act.1 1
A more exotic strategy to limit preemption, and a strategy generally considered
to have been orchestrated by NASAA, 142 occurred in connection with the
enactment of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
("Dodd-Frank Act"). 143 In 2009, an early discussion draft of that legislation was
made available.'" That draft of the legislation, even at that early stage, was an
exceedingly contentious and complex bill that ran well over one thousand pages and
was designed to enact significant reforms in the conduct of financial institutions
and Wall Street practices and to avert future financial crises of the type that had
severely damaged the economy in 2008. Buried deep in that document, however,
was a provision that had nothing to do with financial institutions or Wall Street
reform. Specifically, Section 928 would have eliminated preemption of state
registration authority over Rule 506 offerings, which was the only meaningful
preemption in NSMIA of state registration authority over small business capital
formation. 4 ' Ultimately, the provision did not survive the legislative process, and
the preemption of state registration authority over Section 506 offerings continued.
NASAA continues its vigorous opposition to preemption of state authority over
registration. It has established the NASAA Preemption Resource Center on its

Administrators Association) ("NASAA is opposed to the preemption of the state authority to register
and review securities offerings.").
139
H.R. 2131, 104th Cong. (1995).
'" The statutory basis for the intrastate exemption is 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(11) (2014). Section 3(a) of
the Capital Markets Deregulation and Liberalization Act of 1995 preserved state registration authority
over intrastate offerings. H.R. 2131.
141See 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b) (2014). Section 3(b) of the 1933 Act is statutory basis for exemptions
provided by Rule 504, Rule 505, and Regulation A. Id. § 77c(b) (2014).
" E.g., Scott Edward Walker, A Personal Letter to Senator Dodd Regarding His Anti-Angel
Investment Bill, WALKER CORP. L. GROUP (Mar. 31, 2010), http://walkercorporatelaw.com/angelissues/a-personal-letter-to-senator-dodd-regarding-his-anti-angel-investment-bi;
Broc Romanek,
Dodd Bill Peculiarities: The SEC's Reg D Preemption Gets Hammered, THE CORP. COUNS. (Mar.
23, 2010), http://www.thecorporatecounsel.net/blog/2010/03/an-office-of-investor-advocate.htmi; Bill
Carleton & Joe Wallin, Dodd's Attack on Angel Financing,PUGET SOUND Bus. J. (Mar. 15, 2010,
1:15
PM),
http://www.bizjournals.com/seattle/blog/techflash/2010/03/congress-attack-on-angeL-fnancing.html.
143Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat.
1376 (2010).
" Restoring American Financial Stability Act of 2009, S. 3217, 1 11th Cong. (2009) (as introduced
by Senator Dodd for discussion), available at http://www.llsdc.org/assets/DoddFrankdocs/bill-Iliths3217-discussion-draft.pdf.
145Id.
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website, where it offers up its various activities and its encouragement in the fight
against preemption.146
Not surprisingly, NASAA and its members fought preemption of state
authority over Regulation A+ offerings, following a traditional path of expressing
opposition to preemption through letters commenting on the Commission's
rules. 147 One might additionally assume that NASAA and its members were also
influential in convincing members of the House and the Senate to write letters
directly to the Chair of the Commission opposing preemption over Regulation A+
offerings. 148 It is difficult to miss the implied threat in such letters from members of
the body that controls the Commission's budget. Finally, a new strategy was
unleashed in response to the Commission's preemption of state authority over
Tier
149
2 Regulation A+ offerings, which was to challenge preemption in the courts.
NASAA is subject to criticism for the adverse and inefficient effects its efforts
have had on small business capital formation. Efficient and well-balanced federal
exemptions from registration designed specifically to promote efficient capital
formation for small businesses have been wrecked by state authority over
registration.150 One may, of course, put various spins on NASAA's activities, but it
has at least the spector of turf protection at the expense of efficient capital
formation. It also substantially misallocates state resources, which could be much
more efficiently used to prevent fraud."15
One must realize, however, that NASAA and the state securities regulators that
comprise its membership will never change. They will continue to be-as they have
in the past-an organized, vocal, and formidable force advocating the nonsensical
position that it is appropriate in a market economy to require small businesses that
search for external capital to comply with fifty-plus separate registration regimes.
The Commission for its part has a history over the last twenty years of actions
and inactions enabling NASAA. Principally, the Commission's enabling of
NASAA has taken two forms. The Commission has failed to advocate in favor of
preemption, and the Commission has failed responsibly to use its delegated
authority to expand preemption.
14 NASAA
Preemption Resource Center, NASAA, http://www.nasaa.org/issues-andadvocacy/nasaa-preemption-resource-center/ (last visited Dec. 28, 2015).
147See Adopting Release Regulation A, supra note 3, at 21,857 n.772 (citing the list of letters sent

in opposition). A significant majority of the letters cited therein opposing preemption were either from
NASAA, from those apparently inspired by NASAA's lobbying efforts, or from members of NASAA
(i.e., 14state securities regulators). See id.
8 See id.
149See Petition for Review, Galvin v. SEC, No. 15-1150 (D.C. Cir. May 22, 2015).
"' See, e.g., Campbell, The Wreck of Regulation D, supra note 8, at 922; see also Campbell, A
Moderate Capital,supra note 9, at 80-81.
11 See Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr., Federalism Gone Amuck- The Case for Reallocating
GovernmentalAuthority over the Capital FormationActivities ofBusinesses, 50 WASHBURN L.J. 573,
573-74 (2011) (arguing that states should reallocate "scarce state resources to their most efficient use,
which is the support of the states' enforcement of their antifraud provisions.").
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Actions of the Commission in connection with the enactment and
implementation of NSMIA provide examples of the Commission's significant
failures. First, in the Congressional hearing leading to the adoption of NSMIA, the
Commission refused to support preemption.' State authority over registration was
choking small business capital formation, yet the Commission refused to support
the Congressional remedy that was originally offered, namely broad preemption of
153
state authority over registration.
Even without the Commission's support for preemption, Congress in NSMIA
handed the Commission broad authority to expand preemption by regulation. It
did so by preempting in NSMIA state registration authority over offerings to
"qualified purchasers" and delegating broad authority to the Commission to define
15 4
"qualified purchasers."

In the twenty years after the passage of NSMIA, however, the Commission has
never acted to expand preemption over exempt offerings by small businesses,1 55
even as states' registration obligations have continued to choke small business
capital formation and wreck the Commission's rational, efficient exemptions from
federal registration. 156

The second sin of the Commission, therefore, was its refusal to use its broad
delegated authority to expand preemption by regulation in a manner that enhanced
efficient small business capital formation. This latter failure of the Commission
seems to have been significant enough to cause Congress to say it again in Title IV
of the JOBS Act. Specifically, Title IV of the JOBS Act, in the same language as
used in NSMIA, preempted state authority over Regulation A+ offerings that are
"offered or sold to a qualified purchaser, as defined by the Commission."5 7
Even with this somewhat dramatic reiteration, the Commission once again
refused to enact a regulatory expansion of preemption that would make Regulation
A+ relevant for small business capital formation. Small business-once againwent under the bus as a result of the Commission's enabling action or inaction, and

152 See, e.g., Hearing on H.R. 2131, supra note 138, at 102-31 (statement of Arthur Levitt,
Chairman of the SEC); see also Campbell, The Wreck of Regulation D, supra note 8, at 937 ("The
testimony and prepared remarks of then-Chairman Levitt offered during the legislative hearings
skillfully dodged any support for broad preemption of state authority over securities offerings.").
...
As described above, as originally introduced, NSMIA provided for broad preemption of state
authority over registration, including a preemption of authority over offerings under Section 3(b)
exemptions. See supra notes 139-141 and accompanying text.
154 See 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(3) (2014).
155 The only significant move by the Commission, to define "qualified purchaser," occurred in 2001.
The Commission proposed to define "qualified purchaser" as "any accredited investor" under Regulation
D. Defining the Term "Qualified Purchaser" Under the Securities Act of 1933, 66 Fed. Reg. 66,839,
66,847 (proposed Dec. 27, 2001) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 230). The Commission failed to adopt
this proposal.
156 See Campbell, The Wreck of Regulation D, supra note 8, at 922; see also Campbell, A
Moderate Capital,supra note 9, at 80-81.
57 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(4)(D)(ii).
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Regulation A+ wound up providing a small niche that practically is available only
for larger, closely held (or at least non-reporting) companies.
Perhaps the Commission saw a risk that an expanded preemption over Tier 1
offerings would draw a court challenge from NASAA and state regulators, claiming
that such a regulation exceeded its delegated authority under Tide IV of the JOBS
Act. Obviously, that fear would have been justified, in light of the fact that a suit
challenging the preemption over Tier 2 offerings has been filed."'
Although any suit challenging preemption inevitably will have a significant
disruptive effect,159 it is difficult to imagine that a court will conclude that a broad
preemption over all Regulation A+ offerings exceeds the Commission's delegated
authority under Title IV.
Following the adoption of NSMIA, I wrote urging the Commission to adopt
and implement an expansive view of its power to preempt state registration
authority through the regulatory definition of "qualified purchasers." 160 In
preparing that article, I examined the legislative history of NSMIA as it related to
the Commission's delegated authority to define "qualified purchaser," and I found
Committee language that was confusing, contradictory, and ultimately
16
inconclusive. 1
The statutory language of NSMIA itself, however, shows a very broad
delegation of Commission authority to define "qualified purchaser." As if to
emphasize the breadth of that delegated authority, the statute states that the
Commission may define the term "differently with respect to different categories of
securities." 162 The only limitation on the Commission's authority in the statute is
s See Petition for Review, Galvin v. SEC, No. 15-1150 (D.C. Cir. May 22, 2015).
s It seems unlikely, for example, that many issuers will utilize Tier 2 offerings until the litigation is
resolved. Indeed, these disruptive effects may be part of the new NASAA strategy. The delay of the
effectiveness of the regulation and the risk that a court may strike down the regulation reduce the
anticipated value of the regulation. In addition, the Commission also faces the costs of litigating the
matter. This reduction in the value of the regulation and the regulation's increased costs may deter the
Commission from beneficial risk taking with regard to regulatory expansion of preemption.
60 See Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr., Blue Sky Laws and the Recent CongressionalPreemption
Failure,22 J. CORP. L. 175, 207-10 (1997). Obviously, my arguments fell on deaf ears. See supra notes
154-156 and accompanying text.
161While there is some legislative history of NSMIA reflecting a limitation on the Commission's
authority to define "qualified purchaser," the language from the Committee considering NSMIA is so
confusing as to be essentially worthless. For example, the report states that the definition of "qualified
purchasers" should "[iun all cases ... be rooted in the belief that 'qualified' purchasers are sophisticated
investors, capable of protecting themselves in a manner that renders regulation by State authorities
unnecessary." H.R REP. No. 104-622, at 31 (1996). In the same paragraph, however, the Report states
that "the Commission may define the term 'qualified purchaser' differently with respect to different
categories of securities, consistent with the public interest (including consideration of efficiency,
competition and capital formation) and the protection of investors." Id. at 32. The two sentences cannot
be reconciled, since the first sentence seems to say that the only definition for qualified purchaser is
sophistication, while the second sentence says that the Commission may define the term differently and
explains the factors that can go into that determination.
16215 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(3).
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the requirement that the definition must be "consistent with the public interest and
the protection of investors."63 Another section of NSMIA states that when the
Commission in its rulemaking is required to act "in the public interest, the
Commission shall also consider, in addition to the protection of investors, whether
the action will promote efficiency, competition, and capital formation." 164 In the
case of Title IV, the same statutory language authorizes-once again-the
Commission to preempt state registration authority over Regulation A+
165
offerings.

Any claim that the Commission would exceed its delegated authority by the
preemption of state registration authority over Tier 1 or Tier 2 Regulation A+
offerings seems unsupportable. Both Tier 1 and Tier 2 offerings depend on the
issuer's disclosing closely-tailored investment information to each investor. The
claim that the Commission could not declare an investor that is protected by
disclosure of investment information prescribed by the Commission to be a
"qualified purchaser" is contrary to the core principle of the 1933 Act, which is
disclosure as the bedrock protection for investors.
Even if there is some risk of an erroneous outcome in which a court declares
that the Commission's definition of qualified purchaser exceeds it delegated
authority, the Commission fails its responsibility if it allows the risk of disruption
and the remote risk of an erroneous, adverse court opinion to keep it from doing
the right thing, which is to craft a Regulation A+ that offers small businesses an
efficient access to external capital. Such risks do not justify a bad outcome that is
contrary to the purpose of Title IV.
Notwithstanding, history suggests that the Commission, like NASAA, will
continue down the path it has been on for twenty years, continuing to be unwilling
to expand preemption via regulation. If the Commission is unwilling to do thiseven after Congress has re-delegated to the Commission broad authority in a piece
of legislation entitled "Small Company Capital Formation"--it seems unlikely that
a broadly worded delegation will ever generate the will at the Commission to
preempt state registration over small business capital formation. Indeed, a moment
of reflection reveals that the only preemptions of state authority over exempt
offerings by small businesses have been the result of statute, specifically the
16
preemption over Rule 506 offerings"' and crowdfunding. 1
Simply stated, my conclusion is that the Commission will continue to enable
NASAA and state regulators to preserve a regime to makes it unnecessarily
difficult, inefficient, and unfair for small businesses to access external capital. My
other simple, related conclusion is that only Congress can break this gridlock by
enacting statutory preemptions of state authority over registration.
16 Id.

I-Id. § 77b(b).
165See id. § 77r(b)(3), (b)(4)(D)(ii).
66
Id.§ 77r(b)(4)(C).
6
1 7Id.§ 77r(c)(2)(F).
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CONCLUSION

The Commission's regulatory implementation of Title IV of the JOBS Act fails
to provide small businesses with an efficient and fair access to external capital.
Regulation A+-assuming, as is likely, that it survives the court challenge to the
preemption of state authority over Tier 2 offerings-may find some life as an
exemption for public offerings by larger, non-reporting companies, but the
Regulation A+ rules offer nearly nothing to the millions of small businesses that are
an important component of our national economy.
It is an inescapable irony that Tide IV of the JOBS Act, which is entitled
"Small Company Capital Formation," is of no material benefit to small businesses
searching for external capital. But history continues to repeat itself, and once again,
in the face of an aggressive campaign by NASAA and state regulators, the
Commission was unwilling to use its delegated authority in a way that would
benefit small businesses and the economy as a whole.

